Dragoman Digest

13 November 2026

Nvidia rations China’s access to offshore computing

Overseas data centres face a scramble to find new tenants

Even before the spy scandal that unseated chief executive Jensen Huang, Nvidia had told cloud providers renting out its AI chips that they must sell at least 51 percent of their services to non-Chinese companies. No limit previously applied. Introduced mid-year, the requirement covers the US chipmaker’s clients worldwide but only for future contracts. US export controls broadly bar Chinese companies from buying Nvidia’s leading chips – the most powerful on the market for building AI models. Beijing separately restricts Nvidia imports to promote domestic alternatives. However, US rules generally allow Chinese companies to lease Nvidia hardware overseas, and many do. The chipmaker’s stricter cap is meant to temper US lawmakers’ criticism that it does too little to keep chips out of China.

Alongside the cap, Nvidia is trying to curb Southeast Asian networks believed to have smuggled billions of dollars’ worth of restricted chips into China. Customers in the region must now join its chip-tracking system to become official cloud partners – a status that gives them priority access to its chips. Earlier this year, Nvidia more than halved its list of authorised Asian buyers after tougher compliance checks. Smuggling fell as a result, pushing more Chinese groups to lease offshore and leaving advanced computing power scarce in China. A server rack of Nvidia’s top-end B300 chips sells for about US$600,000 internationally but fetched US$2.8 million in China in October.

Development of leading AI models, and thus demand for computing power, is concentrated among US and Chinese companies. In markets such as Southeast Asia, Chinese groups are the biggest clients of data centres. Malaysia has become a major hub for such leasing. Singaporean cloud provider Megaspeed grew its balance sheet from US$33 million in 2023 to US$3 billion a year later via business from the Chinese group Alibaba. Megaspeed, now under US investigation for suspected chip diversion to China, denies wrongdoing. With little comparable demand elsewhere, operators are already struggling to find enough non-Chinese clients to comply and may have to scale back. The Huang spy scandal has given ammunition to those in Washington pressing for tougher export controls and for restrictions on Chinese companies leasing US chips overseas. Nvidia’s attempt to get ahead of US regulation is unlikely to be enough to prevent it.

 

Syria weighs joining the Mecca Pact

Syria’s membership would make the purpose of the unwieldy alliance even more confused

At the recent Manama Dialogue in Bahrain, Syria’s foreign minister highlighted ongoing negotiations regarding entry into the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, “the Mecca Pact”. The pact brings together Saudi Arabia, NATO member Türkiye, and nuclear-armed Pakistan under a mutual security clause, which broadly resembles NATO’s Article 5. Egypt is also considering joining. At its core, the pact is seen as a response to growing concerns over US reliability and deterrence. For Syria, an accession to the pact would mark a significant step towards its regional reintegration. The members of the fledgling pact also see some benefit in adding Damascus. Syria and its thousands of battle-hardened soldiers with some expertise in drone warfare could provide a useful addition to the alliance. Adding Damascus may also add a level of deterrence against Israeli adventurism in Syria and Lebanon, which has alarmed both Ankara and Riyadh.

Yet, admitting Syria would also bring myriad issues that could further strain the pact’s coherence. There is a risk that Israel’s ongoing occupation of the Golan Heights and consistent strikes on Syrian territory could, in time, prompt Damascus to invoke the pact. This would likely expose differences on how far Islamabad, Ankara, and Riyadh would be willing to go to support Damascus. The response of Türkiye and Pakistan to multiple Houthi attacks on Saudi has so far stopped short of strikes on the group.

When it comes to Syria, the Mecca Pact may ultimately be more of a vector for Saudi’s regional influence than anything else. Riyadh has committed billions to rebuilding Syria’s infrastructure and led successful efforts to lobby the US to remove sanctions. Saudi’s fraternal rival, the UAE, has also been courting Syria with its own largesse, most notably through a US$7 billion property deal in Damascus. Winning over Syria’s military – the most powerful faction within Damascus – may give Riyadh an advantage in the competition for influence.

 

Thailand acts to protect local auto supply chain from a glut of Chinese imports

Tariff-free access and generous subsidies have allowed Chinese brands to corner the market in Thailand

The Thai government has become alarmed about the threat posed by Chinese automakers to the country’s auto sector. From barely having a presence in 2021, Chinese automakers now capture almost 30 percent of all auto sales in ASEAN’s third-largest car market, with the majority of these sales being EVs. In an attempt to level the playing field, Thailand approved lifting excise tax in early November on imported EVs to 35 percent from the current 10 percent, effective in January.

A combination of factors has enabled Chinese brands’ conquest of the Thai auto market, which had historically been dominated by Japanese brands with deep local supply chains. When Thailand introduced generous subsidies for EVs, Chinese brands were well placed to capitalise – facing zero tariffs under the 2010 ASEAN-China free trade agreement. Thailand’s EV promotion efforts also took place just before Chinese brands launched a brutal price war in the Chinese market, which has now spilled over into Thailand. Despite Bangkok’s attempts to make lower excise rates and subsidies contingent on local manufacturing, Chinese brands have been relatively slow to comply. China’s share of Thai auto production is less than 10 percent, well below its 30 percent of sales.

Under the terms of Thailand’s new policy, vehicles which meet local manufacturing and content requirements can keep a 10 percent excise rate, while fully imported vehicles with no local parts face a 35 percent levy. Currently, Chinese automakers’ local content hovers between 40 percent and 60 percent. By contrast, most Japanese manufacturers, who have been slow to adapt to EVs, have local content rates of 70 to 80 percent. Yet there is no guarantee that Bangkok’s new taxes will have a substantial impact. These same Japanese manufacturers who sustain local supply chains primarily produce hybrids and internal combustion vehicles, which still face excise rates of 6 to 15 percent and 25 to 35 percent, respectively. Disparate efforts to protect local auto markets from an onslaught of Chinese imports across Mexico, Russia, and the EU have done little to stem the flood of attractively priced and technologically sophisticated Chinese vehicles.

 

Singapore presses Indonesia on wildfires

Singapore’s push to protect its standing as a business hub has collided with Prabowo’s fragile domestic position

In recent weeks, Singapore summoned executives from 10 firms with Indonesian plantations to answer for their suspected role in rampant forest fires which have engulfed parts of maritime Southeast Asia. The annual fires have been exacerbated by this year’s El Niño climate conditions, prompting a regional environmental crisis that saw Singapore’s air quality briefly rated as the worst in the world. In 2014, Singapore passed the Transboundary Haze Pollution Act specifically to pursue companies behind such fires, but previous enforcement efforts have been frustrated by a lack of political will in Singapore and by a lack of cooperation on the Indonesian side. Companies targeted by Singaporean authorities in October are registered in Singapore, bank in Singapore, or are run by Singaporean residents, including Bumitama Agri, Indofood Agri Resources, and Asia Pulp & Paper Company.

Singapore’s enforcement actions in October provoked a combative response from Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, who described “some countries… mocking, insulting us… when many of their companies here are responsible”. Indonesia also began scaling back its gas exports to Singapore. Days earlier, Energy Minister Bahlil Lahadalia warned of energy export changes to countries that failed to show “mutual respect”. The nationalistic response comes amid mounting domestic pressure on the Prabowo administration, with Prabowo himself trailing West Java Governor Dedi Mulyadi in several polls for the 2029 presidential election.

As of early November, the two countries are taking steps to establish a joint task force to address enforcement issues. This appears to be a pragmatic, face-saving measure which allows Indonesia to maintain its jurisdiction over the matter. It is far from clear if the task force will be successful. Prabowo has been more willing than his predecessors to prosecute environmental violations as part of his efforts to co-opt the resources of Indonesia’s traditional oligarchic elite. However, many of the likely perpetrators of the forest fires remain very influential, and Prabowo will be reluctant to be painted as succumbing to foreign pressure. Singapore may have to try a more assertive approach if it is to achieve a different result after a decade of relative inaction.